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Abstract
Differential privacy is a widely studied notion of privacy for various models of computation, based
on measuring differences between probability distributions. We consider (ε, δ)-differential privacy in
the setting of labelled Markov chains. For a given ε, the parameter δ can be captured by a variant
of the total variation distance, which we call lvα (where α = eε).
First we study lvα directly, showing that it cannot be computed exactly. However, the associated
approximation problem turns out to be in PSPACE and #P-hard. Next we introduce a new
bisimilarity distance for bounding lvα from above, which provides a tighter bound than previously
known distances while remaining computable with the same complexity (polynomial time with
an NP oracle). We also propose an alternative bound that can be computed in polynomial time.
Finally, we illustrate the distances on case studies.
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1 Introduction
Differential privacy [14] is a security property that ensures that a small perturbation of the
input leads to only a small perturbation in the output, so that observing the output makes it
difficult to discern whether a particular piece of information was present in the input. It has
been shown that various bisimilarity distances can bound the differential privacy of a labelled
Markov chain, by bounding for example the ε [6, 31] and δ [9] privacy parameters. Bisimilarity
distances [17, 11] were introduced as a metric analogue of probabilistic bisimulation [23], to
overcome the problem that bisimilarity is too sensitive to minor changes in probabilities.
We further the study of bounds to δ by defining new bisimilarity distances. The bisimilarity
distance of [9], inspired by the work of [31], transpired to be computable in polynomial time
with an NP oracle. The work of [31] defined distances using the Kantorovich metric and the
associated bisimilarity distance based on a fixed point; and considered the effect of replacing
the absolute value function with another metric. For the purposes of (ε, δ)-differential privacy
the distance required is not a metric, nor even a pseudometric, so their methods are adapted
in [9] to account for this; resulting in a distance function bdα which can be used to bound
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Figure 1 Partial order of distances, such that a → b ⇐⇒ a ≤ b. FP is the functional
counterpart of P, where the value of the function can be computed in polynomial time. FPNP
indicates polynomial time with NP oracle. tvα and bdα are introduced in [9] and recalled in
Sections 3 and 6, respectively. The remaining distances are the contribution of this paper.
the δ parameter in differential privacy from above. The function, however, retained the
symmetry property that bdα(s, s′) = bdα(s′, s). In this paper we further study distances
to bound differential privacy in labelled Markov chains, but drop this symmetry property
and discover a tighter bound, which can be computed with the same cost. We also define a
weaker bisimilarity distance for bounding δ that can be computed in polynomial time.
The privacy parameter in question, δ, can be expressed as a variant of the total variation
distance tvα. In particular we define lvα as a single component of tvα (which is a maximum
over two functions). This distance is a way of measuring the maximum difference of
probabilities between any two states. Total variation distance is usually expressed using
absolute difference, but for differential privacy a skew is introduced into this distance. These
exact distances transpire to be very difficult to compute: we confirm that the threshold
distance problem, which asks whether the distance is below a given threshold, is undecidable
and approximating it is #P-hard. We also show that for finite words it can be approximated
in PSPACE. These results match the results of [22] for standard total variation distances.
We then bound the distance lvα from above by a distance ldα which will turn out to
be computable, in a similar manner to how bdα bounds tvα in [9]. We show that ldα can
be computed in polynomial time with an NP oracle (that is, with the same complexity as
bdα). We further generalise ldα to a new distance lgdα, computable in polynomial time.
This new distance, is no smaller than ldα, and we conjecture it might be equal. We can
then take max{ldα(s, s′), ldα(s′, s)} and max{lgdα(s, s′), lgdα(s′, s)} as sound upper bounds
on δ. Thus we have defined the first non-trivial estimate of the δ parameter that can be
computed in polynomial time (trivially, always returning 1 is technically correct). Our results
show that taking the maximum over two ldα is a better approximation than bdα from [9].
We confirm this using several case studies, where we also demonstrate, on a randomised
response mechanism, that the estimates based on ldα can beat standard differential privacy
composition theorems. The relationships between distances are summarised in Figure 1.
Research into behavioural pseudometrics has a long history going back to Giacalone et
al. [17]. Our work lies in the tradition of bisimulation pseudometrics based on the Kantorovich
distance started by Desharnais et al. [11, 12], and builds upon subsequent work on computing
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them [29]. Chatzikokolakis et al. [6] generalised the pseudometric framework to handle
ε-differential privacy, and indeed arbitrary metrics, but did not consider the complexity of
calculating the distances. We introduced a distance in [9] for (ε, δ)-differential privacy, which
is improved upon in this paper. As concerns approximation, we are not aware of any related
work on distances other than the total variation distance [8, 22].
2 Preliminaries
Given a finite set X, let Dist(X) be the set of all stochastic vectors in RX . If X is a set of
symbols then X∗ is the set of all sequences of symbols in X, X+ all sequences of length at
least one, and Xω all infinite sequences.
I Definition 1 (labelled Markov chains (LMC’s)). A labelled Markov chain M is a tuple
〈S,Σ, µ, `〉, where S is a finite set of states, Σ is a finite alphabet, µ : S → Dist(S) is the
transition function and ` : S → Σ is the labelling function.
We assume that all transition probabilities are rational, represented as a pair of binary
integers. size(M) is the number of bits required to represent 〈S,Σ, µ, `〉, including the bit
size of the probabilities. We will write µs for µ(s).
In what follows, we study probabilities associated with infinite sequences of labels
generated by LMC’s. We specify the relevant probability spaces next using standard measure
theory [5, 2]. Let us start with the definition of cylinder sets.
I Definition 2. A subset C ⊆ Σω is a cylinder set if there exists u ∈ Σ∗ such that C consists
of all infinite sequences from Σω whose prefix is u. We then write Cu to refer to C.
Cylinder sets play a prominent role in measure theory in that their finite unions can be
used as a generating family (an algebra) for the set FΣ of measurable subsets of Σω (the
cylindrical σ-algebra). Where clear from context we will omit Σ in the subscript of F . What
will be important for us is that any measure ν on (Σω,FΣ) is uniquely determined by its
values on cylinder sets [5, Chapter 1, Section 2][2, Section 10.1]. Next we show how to assign
a measure νs on (Σω,FΣ) to an arbitrary state of an LMCM.
I Definition 3. Given M = 〈S,Σ, µ, `〉, let µ+ : S+ → [0, 1] and `+ : S+ → Σ+ be the
natural extensions of the functions µ and ` to S+, i.e. µ+(s0 · · · sk) =
∏k−1
i=0 µsi(si+1) and
`+(s0 · · · sk) = `(s0) · · · `(sk), where k ≥ 0 and si ∈ S (0 ≤ i ≤ k). Note that, for any
s ∈ S, we have µ+(s) = 1. Given s ∈ S, let Pathss(M) be the subset of S+ consisting of all
sequences that start with s.
I Definition 4. LetM = 〈S,Σ, µ, `〉 and s ∈ S. We define νs : FΣ → [0, 1] to be the unique
measure on (Σω,FΣ) such that for any cylinder Cu we have νs(Cu) =
∑
µ+(p) where the
summation is over p ∈ Pathss(M) such that `+(p) = u.
I Example 5 (transition-labelled LMC’s). Like in [29, 7, 1, 27, 9], Definition 1 features
labelled states. However, Markov chains with labelled transitions can also be described in
the framework of that definition.
In particular, suppose we are given a chainM of the form 〈S,Σ, T 〉, where S is a finite set
of states, Σ is a finite alphabet and T : S → Dist(S ×Σ) is the transition function. We write
each transition as q p−→
a
q′, meaning that T (q)(q′, a) = p. From this transition-labelled LMC,
we create an equivalent state-labelled Markov chainM′: for each state and each label, add
new state (q, a) labelled with a, such that, when q p−→
b
q′, we have µ(q,a)((q′, b)) = p for every
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a ∈ Σ. Technically, this delays reading of the first character until the second state visited.
To account for this, introduce an additional character, say `, so that νs(Cw) = ν′(s,`)(C`w),
where ν and ν′ refer to the measures associated withM andM′ respectively (Definition 4).
I Example 6 (finite-word LMC’s). We can also describe labelled Markov chains over finite
words. These chains have a set of final states F , which have no outgoing transitions. We
require positive probability of reaching a final state from every reachable state. We define the
function νs(w) =
∑
µ+(p), where the summation is over p ∈ Pathss(M) such that `+(p) = w
and p|w| ∈ F , so that we only consider paths which end in a final state. The function can be
extended to sets of words E ⊆ Σ∗ (which are countable) by νs(E) =
∑
w∈E νs(w).
Such machines can also be represented by infinite-word Markov chains. One can simulate
the end of the word by an additional character, say $ such that, for q ∈ F , µq(q) = 1 and
`(q) = $, so that the only trace that can be observed from q is $ω. Then, for a word w ∈ Σ∗,
we rather study w$$$ . . . , corresponding to the cylinder Cw$. In the translated infinite-word
model, the event Cu corresponds to the event {w ∈ Σ∗ | prefix(w) = u} in the original
finite-word model. Some of our arguments will be carried out in the finite-word setting, as
hardness results that apply to these chains also apply to infinite-word Markov chains. Other
arguments will only be possible in the finite-word setting.
Let us return to the general definition of Markov chains (Definition 1). Our aim will
be to compare states from the point of view of differential privacy. Any two states s, s′
can be viewed as indistinguishable if νs(E) = νs′(E) for every E ∈ F . More generally,
the difference between them can be quantified using the total variation distance, defined
by tv(ν, ν′) = supE∈F |ν(E) − ν′(E)|. GivenM = 〈S,Σ, µ, `〉 and s, s′ ∈ S, we shall write
tv(s, s′) to refer to tv(νs, νs′). Ensuring such pairs of measures (νs, νs′) are “similar” is
essential for privacy, so that it is difficult to observe which of the states was the originating
position. To measure probabilities relevant to differential privacy, we will need to study a
more general variant lvα of the above distance, which we introduce shortly.
3 (ε, δ)-Differential Privacy
Differential privacy is a mathematically rigorous definition of privacy due to Dwork et al [14];
the aim is to ensure that inputs which are related in some sense lead to very similar outputs.
Formally it requires that for two related states there only ever be a small change in output
probabilities, and therefore discerning which of the two states was actually used is difficult,
maintaining their privacy. We rely on the definition of approximate differential privacy in
the context of labelled Markov chains, as per [9].
I Definition 7. Let M = 〈S,Σ, µ, `〉 be a labelled Markov chain and let R ⊆ S × S be a
symmetric relation. Given ε ≥ 0 and δ ∈ [0, 1], we say thatM is (ε, δ)-differentially private
w.r.t. R if, for every s, s′ ∈ S such that (s, s′) ∈ R, we have νs(E) ≤ eε · νs′(E) + δ for every
measurable set E ∈ F .
What it means for two states to be related, as specified by R, is to a large extent domain-
specific. In general, R makes it possible to spell out which states should not appear too
different and, consequently, should enjoy a quantitative amount of privacy.
Note that each state s ∈ S can be viewed as defining a random variable Xs with
outcomes from Σω such that P[Xs ∈ E] = νs(E). Then the above can be rewritten as
P[Xs ∈ E] ≤ eε P[Xs′ ∈ E] + δ, which matches the definition from [14], where one would
consider Xs, Xs′ neighbouring in some natural sense. In the typical database scenario, one
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would relate database states that differ by exactly one entry. In our setting, we refer to
states of a machine, for which we would like it to be indiscernible as to which was the start
state, assuming that the states are hidden and the traces are observable.
When δ = 0, we use the term ε-differential privacy, which amounts to measuring the
ratio between the probabilities of possible outcomes. When one cannot expect to achieve this
pure ε-differential privacy, the relaxed approximate differential privacy is used [24]. When
ε = 0, δ is captured exactly by the statistical distance (total variation distance) tv .
Our aim is to capture the value of δ required to satisfy the differential privacy property
for a given ε. That is, given a LMC M, a symmetric relation R and α = eε ≥ 1, we
want to determine the smallest δ such that M is (ε, δ)-differentially private with respect
to R. We can measure the difference between two measures ν, ν′ on (Σω,F) as follows:
tvα(ν, ν′) = supE∈F ∆α(ν(E), ν′(E)) where ∆α(a, b) = max{a − αb, b − αa, 0} [3]. When
used on νs, νs′ and α = eε, tvα(s, s′) gives the required δ between states s, s′ [9].
In this paper we observe that significant simplification occurs by splitting the two main
parts of the maximum, taking only the “left variant”. Whilst ∆α is symmetric, we break
this property to introduce a new distance function Λα (similarly to [4]). Then we define an
analogous total variation distance lvα, which will be our main object of study.
I Definition 8 (Asymmetric skewed total variation distance). Let α ≥ 1. Given two measures
ν, ν′ on (Σω,F), let lvα(ν, ν′) = supE∈F Λα(ν(E), ν′(E)), where Λα(a, b) = max{a− αb, 0}.
We will write lvα(s, s′) for lvα(νs, νs′). Note that it is not required to take the maximum
with zero, that is lvα(ν, ν′) = supE∈F ν(E) − αν′(E), since there is always an event such
that ν′(E) = 0, in particular ν(∅) = 0. Observe that ∆α and Λα are not metrics as
∆α(a, b) = 0 6=⇒ a = b, and in fact not even pseudometrics as the triangle inequality does
not hold. Our new distance Λα (and lvα) is not symmetric, while ∆α and tvα are.
If α = 1, then lv1 = tv1 = tv, since if ν, ν′ are probability measures and we have
ν(E) = 1−ν(E) then supE∈F |ν(E)−ν′(E)| = supE∈F ν(E)−ν′(E) = supE∈F ν′(E)−ν(E),
i.e., despite the use of the absolute value in the definition of tv, it is not required.
We can reformulate differential privacy in terms of tvα and lvα.
I Proposition 9. Given a labelled Markov chainM and a symmetric relation R ⊆ S × S,
the following properties are equivalent for α = eε:
M is (ε, δ)-differentially private w.r.t. R,
max(s,s′)∈R tvα(s, s′) ≤ δ, and
max(s,s′)∈R lvα(s, s′) ≤ δ.
We now focus on computing lvα, since this will allow us to determine the “level” of
differential privacy for a given ε. Henceforth we will refer to eε as α. For the purposes of our
complexity arguments, we will only use rational α with O(size(M))-bit representation.
4 lvα is not computable
tv(s, s′) turns out to be surprisingly difficult to compute: the threshold distance problem
(whether the distance is strictly greater than a given threshold) is undecidable, and the
non-strict variant of the problem (“greater or equal”) is not known to be decidable [22]. The
undecidability result is shown by reduction from the emptiness problem for probabilistic
automata to the threshold distance problem for finite-word transition-labelled Markov chains.
Recall that such chains are a special case of our more general definition of infinite-word
state-labelled Markov chains. Thus, the problem is undecidable in this case also.
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Figure 2 Markov chainM′ in the reduction from tv(q, q′) to lvα(s, s′).
Since tv = lv1, we know that lv1(s, s′) > θ is undecidable. We show that this is not
special, that is, the problem remains undecidable for any fixed α > 1. In other words, no
value of the privacy parameter ε makes it possible to compute the optimal δ exactly.
I Theorem 10. Finding a value of tv reduces in polynomial time to finding a value of lvα.
Proof. Given a labelled Markov chain M = 〈Q,Σ, µ, `〉, and states q, q′ for which we
require the answer tv(q, q′), we construct a new labelled Markov chain M′, for which
lvα(s, s′) = tv(q, q′).
We defineM′ = 〈Q∪{s, s′,⊥},Σ′, µ′, `′〉, with `′(s) = `′(s′) = B, `′(⊥) = C, `′(x) = `(x)
for all x ∈ Q, Σ′ = Σ ∪ {B,C},
µ′s(q) = 1, µ′s′(q′) =
1
α
, µ′s′(⊥) =
α− 1
α
, and µ′x(y) = µx(y) for all x, y ∈ Q.
The reduction, sketched in Figure 2, adds three new states, so can be done in polynomial
time. We claim lvα(s, s′) = tv(q, q′).
Consider E ∈ FΣ, observe that νq(E) = νs(E′) and νq′(E) = ανs′(E′), where E′ =
{Bw | w ∈ E} ∈ FΣ′ . Then νq(E)− νq′(E) = νs(E′)− ανs′(E′) and lvα(s, s′) ≥ tv(q, q′).
Conversely, consider an event E′ ∈ FΣ′ . Since the character C can only be reached from
s′, any word using it contributes negatively to the difference. Hence intersecting the event
with BΣω, to remove C, can only increase the difference. The character B must occur (only)
as the first character of every (useful) word in E′. Let E = {w | Bw ∈ E′ ∩ BΣω} ∈ FΣ,
then νq(E)− νq′(E) ≥ νs(E′)− ανs′(E′). Thus tv(q, q′) ≥ lvα(s, s′). J
Since an oracle to solve decision problems for lvα would solve problems for tv , we obtain
the following result.
I Corollary 11. lvα(s, s′) > θ is undecidable for α ≥ 1.
It is not clear that lvα reduces easily to tv . Arguments along the lines of the proof of Theo-
rem 10 may not result in a Markov chain due to non-stochastic transitions, or modifications
to the s→ q branch may result in new maximising events.
D. Chistikov, A. S. Murawski, and D. Purser 10:7
5 Approximation of lvα
Given that lvα cannot be computed exactly, we turn to approximation: the problem, given
γ > 0, of finding some x such that |x − lvα(s, s′)| ≤ γ. For α = 1, it is known that
approximating tv = lv1 is possible in PSPACE but #P-hard [8, 22]. We show that the
case α = 1 is not special; that is, when α > 1, lvα can also be approximated and the same
complexity bounds apply.
I Remark. Typically one might suggest being ε close (|x− lvα(s, s′)| ≤ ε). To avoid confusion
with the differential privacy parameter, we refer to γ close.
I Theorem 12. For finite-word Markov chains, approximation of lvα(s, s′) within γ can be
performed in PSPACE and is #P-hard.
Proof (sketch). For the upper bound, we show that the ith bit of an x such that |x −
lvα(s, s′)| ≤ γ can be found in PSPACE. The approach, inspired by [22], is to consider
the maximising event of lvα(s, s′) = supE⊆Σ∗ νs(E) − ανs′(E), which turns out to be
W = {w | νs(w) ≥ ανs′(w)}, so that lvα(s, s′) = νs(W ) − ανs′(W ). This choice of the
maximising event only applies to finite-word Markov chains, thus the proof does not extend
in full generality to infinite-word Markov chains. The shape of the event is the key difference
between our proof and [22], which uses events of the form {w | νs(w) ≥ νs′(w)}.
Let W denote the complement of W and let νs(W ) be approximated by a number X and
νs′(W ) by a number Y . Normally, one would expect X to be close to νs(W ) and Y to be
close to νs′(W ). Here, the trick is to require only that νs(W ) +ανs′(W ) be close to X +αY .
It is then argued that, for specific X,Y with this property, one can find any bit of X + αY .
For the lower bound, we note that approximating tv is #P-hard [22], by a reduction from
#NFA, a #P-complete problem [20]. That is, given a non-deterministic finite automaton A
and n ∈ N in unary, determine |Σn ∩ L(A)|, the number of accepted words of A of length n.
Since tv can be reduced to lvα (Theorem 10), approximating lvα is #P-hard as well. The
hardness result applies to finite-word transition-labelled Markov chains, thus also to the
more general infinite-word labelled Markov chains. J
6 A least fixed point bound ldα
We seek to bound lvα from above by a computable quantity, and will introduce a distance
function ldα for this. We first introduce a variant of the Kantorovich lifting as a technique to
measure the distance between probability distributions on a set X, given a distance function
between objects of X. We show that lvα can be reformulated using such a distance over the
(infinite) trace distributions νs, νs′ . We then define an alternative distance function between
states, ldα, as the fixed point of the Kantorovich lifting of distances from individual states
to (finite) state distributions. We will observe that it is possible to compute and acts as a
sound bound on lvα.
We use this distance to determine (ε, δ)-differential private w.r.t. relation R by bounding
δ with max(s,s′)∈R ldα(s, s′). We will show this can be achieved in polynomial time with
access to an NP oracle, by computing ldα(s, s′) exactly in this time (|R| is polynomial with
respect to the size ofM). This suggests a complexity lower than approximation (which is
#P-hard by Theorem 12).
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I Definition 13 (Asymmetric Skewed Kantorovich Lifting). For a set X, given d : X ×X →
[0, 1] a distance function and measures µ, µ′, we define
KΛα (d)(µ, µ′) = sup
f :X→[0,1]
∀x,x′∈X Λα(f(x),f(x′))≤d(x,x′)
Λα(
∫
X
fdµ,
∫
X
fdµ′)
where f ranges over functions which are measurable w.r.t. µ and µ′.
I Remark. The (standard) Kantorovich distance lifts a distance function d over the ground
objects X to a distance between measures µ, µ′ on the set X. This is equivalent to replacing
Λα with the absolute distance function (abs(a, b) = |a−b|). We note that KΛα (d) is equivalent
to the standard Kantorovich distance for α = 1 and d symmetric [21, 10]. If |X| < ∞
(for example when X is a finite set of states, S), we have
∫
X
fdµ =
∑
x∈X f(x)µ(x).
Chatzikokolakis et al. [6] considered the case where the absolute value function was replaced
by any metric d′. Our lifting KΛα does not quite fit in this framework, since Λα is not metric.
The interest in KΛα is that it allows us to reformulate the definition of the distance function
lvα. Our goal is to measure the difference between measures over infinite traces νs, νs′ , and
so we lift a distance function over infinite words (d : Σω × Σω → [0, 1]). In particular, we lift
the discrete metric 16= (the indicator function over inequality with 16=(w,w′) = 1 for w 6= w′,
and 0 otherwise).
I Lemma 14. lvα(s, s′) = KΛα (16=)(νs, νs′).
Since computing lvα, or now KΛα (16=)(νs, νs′), is difficult, we introduce an upper bound
on lvα, inspired by bisimilarity distances, which we will call ldα. This will be the least
fixed point of ΓΛα, a function which measures (relative to a distance function d) the distance
between the transition distributions of s, s′ where s, s′ share a label, or 1 when they do not.
I Definition 15. Let ΓΛα : [0, 1]S×S → [0, 1]S×S be defined as follows.
ΓΛα(d)(s, s′) =
{
KΛα (d)(µs, µs′) `(s) = `(s′)
1 otherwise
The utility of this function is that we are not now using the Kantorovich lifting over infinite
trace distributions, but rather over finite transition distributions (µs ∈ Dist(S)).
Note that [0, 1]S×S equipped with the pointwise order, written v, is a complete lattice
and that Γα is monotone with respect to that order (larger d permit more functions, thus
larger supremum). Consequently, ΓΛα has a least fixed point [28]. We take our distance to be
exactly that point.
I Definition 16. Let ldα : S × S → [0, 1] be the least fixed point of ΓΛα.
To provide a guarantee of privacy we require a sound upper bound on lvα.
I Theorem 17. lvα(s, s′) ≤ ldα(s, s′) for every s, s′ ∈ S.
The proof of Theorem 17 proceeds similarly to Lemma 2 in [9]. We will see, however, that
this upper bound on lvα is stronger (or at least no worse) than the bound obtained in [9].
Recall from [9] that bdα is defined as the least fixed point of
Γ∆α (d)(s, s′) =
{
K∆α (d)(µs, µs′) `(s) = `(s′)
1 otherwise
where K∆α (d) behaves as KΛα (d), but uses ∆α(a, b) = max{a − αb, b − αa, 0} rather than
Λα(a, b) = max{a− αb, 0}.
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LD-threshold(s, s′, θ) = ∃(di,j)i,j∈S
∧
i,j∈S
(0 ≤ di.j ≤ 1) ∧ ds,s′ ≤ θ
∧
∧
q,q′∈S
{
dq,q′ = 1 `(q) 6= `(q′)
couplingConstraint(d, q, q′) `(q) = `(q′)
couplingConstraint(d, q, q′) = ∃(ωi,j)i,j∈S ∃(γi)i∈S ∃(τi)i∈S ∃(ηi)i∈S
∑
i,j∈S
ωi,j · di,j +
∑
i
ηi ≤ dq,q′ ∧
∧
i,j∈S
(0 ≤ ωi,j ≤ 1) ∧
∧
i∈S

0 ≤ γi ≤ 1
0 ≤ τi ≤ 1
0 ≤ ηi ≤ 1
∧
∧
i∈S
(
∑
j∈S
ωi,j − γi + τi + ηi = µq(i)) ∧
∧
j∈S
(
∑
i∈S
ωi,j +
τj − γj
α
≤ µq′(j))
Figure 3 NP Formula for LD-threshold.
I Theorem 18. max{ldα(s, s′), ldα(s′, s)} ≤ bdα(s, s′) for every s, s′ ∈ S.
Proof. Given a matrix A, let AT be its transpose. Consider bdα and ldα as matrices. bdα is
the least fixed point of Γ∆α so Γ∆α (bdα)(s, s′) = bdα(s, s′). Also notice that ΓΛα(bdα)(s, s′) ≤
Γ∆α (bdα)(s, s′), since KΛα (bdα) v K∆α (bdα). To see this, note that, because bdα = bdTα, the
relevant set of functions is the same, but the objective function in the supremum is smaller.
Hence ΓΛα(bdα) v bdα, i.e. bdα is also a pre-fixed point of ΓΛα. Since ldα is the least pre-
fixed point of ΓΛα then we know ldα v bdα. By symmetry, bdα = bdTα giving ldα v bdTα and
then ldTα v bdα. We conclude max{ldα(s, s′), ldα(s′, s)} ≤ bdα(s, s′) for every s, s′ ∈ S. J
I Remark. Example 32 on page 13 demonstrates the inequality in Theorem 18 can be strict.
The standard variant of the Kantorovich metric is often presented in its dual formulation.
In the case of finite distributions, the asymmetric skewed Kantorovich distance exhibits a
dual form. This is obtained through the standard recipe for dualising linear programming.
Interestingly, this technique yields a linear optimisation problem over a polytope independent
of d, and that will prove useful in the computation of ldα.
I Lemma 19. Let X be finite and given d : X×X → [0, 1] a distance function, µ, µ′ ∈ Dist(X)
we have
KΛα (d)(µ, µ′) = min(ω,η)∈Ωα
µ,µ′
( ∑
s,s′∈X
ωs,s′ · d(s, s′) +
∑
s∈X
ηs
)
, where
Ωαµ,µ′ =
(ω, η) ∈ [0, 1]X×X × [0, 1]X |
∃γ, τ ∈ [0, 1]X
∀i :
∑
j ωi,j + τi − γi + ηi = µ(i)
∀j :
∑
i ωi,j +
τj−γj
α ≤ µ
′(j)
 .
When we refer to distance between states (X = S) we write Ωαs,s′ to mean Ωαµs,µs′ . We take
V (Ωαs,s′) to be the vertices of the polytope.
I Theorem 20. ldα can be computed in polynomial time with access to an NP oracle.
We first show that the LD-threshold problem, which asks if ldα(s, s′) ≤ θ, is in NP. This
is achieved through the formula shown in Figure 3, based on Lemma 19 and [30] which used
a similar formula to approximate bisimilarity distances. The problem can be solved in NP
CONCUR 2019
10:10 Asymmetric Distances for Approximate Differential Privacy
as each of the variables can be shown to be satisfied in the optimal solution with rational
numbers that are of polynomial size (see [9, Theorems 1 and 2]). It suffices to guess these
numbers (non-deterministically) and verify the correctness of the formula in polynomial time.
Since the threshold problem can be solved in NP, we can approximate the value using
binary search with polynomial overhead to arbitrary accuracy γ, thus we find a value x such
that |x− ldα(s, s′)| ≤ γ. In fact, one can find the exact value of ldα(s, s′) in polynomial time
assuming the oracle. We can show the value of ldα is rational and its size is polynomially
bounded, one can find it by approximation to a carefully chosen level of precision and then
finding the relevant rational with the continued fraction algorithm [18, Section 5.1][16].
7 A greatest fixed point bound lgdα
In the previous section we have used the least fixed point of ΓΛα, which finds the fixed point
closest to our objective lvα. We now consider relaxing this requirement so that we can find a
fixed point in polynomial time. We will introduce lgdα, expressing the greatest fixed point
and represent it as a linear program that can be solved in polynomial time. Relaxing to any
fixed point could of course be much worse than ldα, so we first refine our fixed point function
(ΓΛα) to reduce the potential gap. We do this by characterising the elements which are zero
in ldα and fixing these as such; so that they cannot be larger in the greatest fixed point.
Refinement of ΓΛα
In the case of standard bisimulation distances the kernel of ld1, that is {(s, s′) | ld1(s, s′) = 0},
is exactly bisimilarity. We consider the kernel for ldα and define a new relation ∼α, which
we call skewed bisimilarity, which captures zero distance.
I Definition 21. Let a relation R ⊆ S × S have the property
(s, s′) ∈ R ⇐⇒ ∃ (ω, η) ∈ Ωαs,s′ s.t. (ωu,v > 0 =⇒ (u, v) ∈ R) ∧ ∀u ηu = 0.
Arbitrary unions of such relations also maintain the property, thus a largest such relation
exists. Let ∼α be the largest relation with this property.
I Remark. When α = 1 the formulation corresponds to an alternative characterisation of
bisimilarity [19, 27], so ∼1 = ∼.
I Lemma 22. ldα(s, s′) = 0 if and only if s ∼α s′.
Since ldα(s, s′) = 0 implies lvα(s, s′) = 0, this also provides a way to show that δ is zero,
that is, to show ε-differential privacy holds. However, note this is not a complete method to
do this, and there are bisimilarity distances focused on finding ε [6].
I Lemma 23. If s ∼α s′ then lvα(s, s′) = 0.
We need to be able to quickly and independently compute which pairs of states are
related by ∼α. In fact we can do this in polynomial time using a closure procedure, which
will terminate after polynomially many rounds.
I Proposition 24. ∼α can be computed in polynomial time in size(M).
Proof. We present a standard refinement algorithm, let A0 = S × S and compute Ai+1 =
{(s, s′) ∈ Ai | ∃(ω, η) ∈ Ωαs,s′ : η = 0 ∧ (ωu,v > 0 =⇒ (u, v) ∈ Ai)}. To find this, define
1!Ai , a matrix such that 1!Ai(s, s′) = 0 if (s, s′) ∈ Ai and 1 otherwise. Apply ΓΛα to 1!Ai ,
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which amounts to computing n2 linear programs. Take Ai+1 to be indices of the matrix
where ΓΛα(1!Ai) is zero. At each step, we remove at least one element, or stabilise so that the
set will not change in subsequent rounds. After n2 steps it is either stable or empty.
An2 ⊆∼α: after convergence we have some set such that (s, s′) ∈ An2 =⇒ ∃(ω, η) ∈
Ωαs,s′ : η = 0 ∧ (ωu,v > 0 =⇒ (u, v) ∈ An2). ∼α is the largest such set, so it contains An2 .
∼α⊆ An2 : by induction we start with ∼α⊆ A0 and only remove pairs not in ∼α. J
Recall that ldα was defined as the least fixed point of ΓΛα. Let us refine ΓΛα so the gap
between the least fixed point and the greatest is as small as possible. We do this by fixing
the known values of the least fixed point in the function, in particular the zero cases. We let
Γ′Λα (d)(s, s′) =
{
0 s ∼α s′
ΓΛα(d)(s, s′) otherwise
and observe that ldα is also the least fixed point of Γ′Λα .
I Lemma 25. ldα is the least fixed point of Γ′Λα .
Definition and Computation of lgdα
Towards a more efficiently computable function, we now study the greatest fixed point.
I Definition 26. We let lgdα be the greatest fixed point of Γ′Λα .
It is equivalent to consider the greatest post-fixed point. It turns out that when α = 1,
lgd1 = ld1 [7]. We do not know if this holds for α > 1, although conjecture that it might.
Whilst it may not necessarily be as tight a bound on lvα as ldα, we can also use lgdα to
bound lvα, thus the δ parameter of (ε, δ)-differential privacy. Because ldα(s, s′) ≤ lgdα(s, s′)
for every s, s′ ∈ S, then Theorem 17 implies that lvα(s, s′) ≤ lgdα(s, s′), for every s, s′ ∈ S.
We will show that lgdα can be computed in polynomial time using the ellipsoid method
for solving a linear program of exponential size, matching the result of [7] for standard
bisimilarity distances. Whilst we will not need to express the entire linear program in one go,
we may need any one constraint at a time, so we need to be able to express each constraint,
in polynomially many bits. We show that the representation of vertices of Ωαs,s′ is small.
I Lemma 27. Each (ω, η) ∈ V (Ωαs,s′) are rational numbers requiring a number of bits
polynomial in size(M).
Proof. Consider the polytope:
Ω′αµ,µ′ =
{
(ω, τ, γ, η) ∈ [0, 1]S×S × ([0, 1]S)3 | ∀i :
∑
j ωi,j + τi − γi + ηi = µ(i)
∀j :
∑
i ωi,j +
τj−γj
α ≤ µ
′(j)
}
Each vertex is the intersection of hyperplanes defined in terms of µ, µ′ (rationals given in
the inputM), thus vertices of Ω′αµ,µ′ are rationals with representation size polynomial in the
input. Vertices of Ωαµ,µ′ = {(ω, η) | ∃τ, γ (ω, τ, γ, η) ∈ Ω′αµ,µ′} require only fewer bits. J
The following linear program (LP) expresses the greatest post-fixed point. It has polyno-
mially many variables but exponentially many constraints (for each s, s′ one constraint for
each ω ∈ V (Ωαs,s′)). Since linear programs can be solved in polynomial time, the greatest
fixed point can be found in exponential time using the exponential size linear program.
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I Proposition 28. lgdα is the optimal solution, d ∈ [0, 1]S×S of the following linear program:
maxd∈[0,1]S×S
∑
(u,v)∈S×S du,v subject to: for all s, s′ ∈ S:
ds,s′ = 0 whenever s ∼α s′,
ds,s′ = 1 whenever `(s) 6= `(s′),
ds,s′ ≤
∑
(u,v)∈S×S
ωu,vdu,v +
∑
u∈S
ηu for all (ω, η) ∈ V (Ωαs,s′) otherwise.
Proof. The s ∼α s′ and `(s) 6= `(s′) cases follow by definition. Observe that by the definition
of lgdα as a post-fixed point it is required that d(s, s′) ≤ Γ′Λα (d)(s, s′) = KΛα (d)(s, s′) =
min(ω,η)∈Ωα
s,s′
∑
(u,v)∈S×S ωu,vdu,v +
∑
u∈S ηu or equivalently, for all (ω, η) ∈ Ωαs,s′ : d(s, s′) ≤∑
(u,v)∈S×S ωu,vdu,v +
∑
u∈S ηu J
In the spirit of [7], we can solve the exponential-size linear program given in Proposition 28
using the ellipsoid method, in polynomial time. Whilst the linear program has exponentially
many constraints, it has only polynomially many variables. Therefore, the ellipsoid method
can be used to solve the linear program in polynomial time, provided a polynomial-time
separation oracle can be given [26, Chapter 14]. Separation oracle takes as argument
d ∈ [0, 1]S×S , a proposed solution to the linear program and must decide whether d satisfies
the constraints or not. If not then it must provide θ ∈ Q|S×S| as a separating hyperplane
such that, for every d′ that does satisfy the constraints,
∑
u,v du,vθu,v <
∑
u,v d
′
u,vθu,v.
Our separation oracle will perform the following: for every s, s′ ∈ S check that d(s, s′) ≤
min(ω,η)∈Ωα
s,s′
ω · d + η · 1. This is done by solving min(ω,η)∈Ωα
s,s′
ω · d + η · 1 using linear
programming. If every check succeeds, return yes. If some check fails for s, s′ return no and
θu,v =
{
ωu,v − 1 (u, v) = (s, s′)
ωu,v otherwise
where (ω, η) = argmin
(ω,η)∈V (Ωα
s,s′
)
d · ω + η · 1.
I Lemma 29. θ is a separating hyperplane, i.e., it separates the unsatisfying d and all
satisfying d′.
I Theorem 30. lgdα can be found in polynomial time in the size ofM.
Proof. Checking d(s, s′) ≤ minω,η∈Ωα
s,s′
ω · d+ η · 1 is polynomial time. The linear program
is of polynomial size, so runs in polynomial time in the size of the encoding of the linear
program. Similarly finding θ is polynomial time by running essentially the same linear
program and reading off the minimising result.
Because pairs (ω, η) are in V (Ωαs,s′), they are polynomial size in the size ofM, independent
of d, by Lemma 27. Note that, unlike in Chen et al. [7], the oracle procedure is not strongly
polynomial, so the time to find θ may depend on the size of d, but the output θ and d remain
polynomial in the size of the initial system.
We conclude there is a procedure for computing lgdα running in polynomial time [26,
Theorem 14.1, Page 173]. There exists a polynomial ψ where the ellipsoid algorithm solves the
linear program in time T ·ψ(size(M)), where T is the time the separation algorithm takes on
inputs of size ψ(size(M)). Since the T ∈ poly(ψ(size(M))) and ψ(size(M)) ∈ poly(size(M))
then T ∈ poly(size(M)). Overall we have T · ψ(size(M)) ∈ poly(size(M)). J
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(b) Calculated approximations of δ given ε.
Figure 4 PIN Checker example: each state denotes its label, transition probabilities on arrows.
8 Examples
I Example 31 (PIN Checker). We demonstrate our methods are a sound technique for
determining the δ privacy parameter (given eε, where ε is the other privacy parameter).
We take as an example, in Figure 4, a PIN checking system from [32, 31]. Intuitively, the
machine accepts or rejects a code (a or b). Instead of accepting a code deterministically, it
probabilistically decides whether to accept. The machine allows an attempt with the other
code if it is not accepted. We model the system that accepts more often on the the pin-code
a, from state 0, and the system that accepts more often from code b, from state 1. The chain
simulates attempts to gain access to the system by trying code a then b until the system
accepts (reaching the “end” state). Pen-and-paper analysis can determine that the system
is (ln( 28092209 ), 0)-differentially private, or at the other extreme (0,
200
2503 )-differentially private
( 28092209 ≈ 1.27,
200
2503 ≈ 0.0799). The true privacy, lvα is shown along the orange line (N).
In the blue line (•) we see the estimate bdα as defined in [9]; which correctly bounds
the true privacy, but is unresponsive to α. Using the methods introduced in this paper we
compute ldα on the red line () and lgdα on the black line (), which coincide. We observe
that this is an improvement and is within approximately 1.5 times the true privacy for
α ≤ 1.035. In this example observe that ldα = lgdα; suggesting lgdα, which can be computed
in polynomial time is as good as ldα. Our results do eventually suffer, as increasing α cannot
find a better δ, despite a lower value existing.
I Example 32 (Randomised Response). The randomised response mechanism allows a data
subject to reveal a secret answer to a potentially humiliating or sensitive question honestly
with some degree of plausible deniability. This is achieved by flipping a biased coin and
providing the wrong answer with some probability based on the coin toss. If there are two
answers a or b, answering truthfully with probability β1+β and otherwise with
1
1+β leads to
ε-differential privacy where eε = β and such a bound is tight (there is no smaller ε′ such that
answering in this way gives ε′-differential privacy). However, it can be (ε′, δ)-differentially
private for ε′ < ε and some δ.
Let us consider the single-input, single-output randomised response mechanism shown
in Figure 5a with β = 2, hence ln(2)-differentially private, alternatively it is (ln( 65 ),
4
15 )-
differential privacy (ln( 65 ) ≈
ln(2)
4 ). We consider the application of composing automata to
determine more complex properties automatically.
Differential privacy enjoys multiple composition theorems [15]. When applied to disjoint
datasets, differential privacy allows the results of (ε, δ)-differentially private mechanism applied
to each independently to be combined with no additional loss in privacy. Let us consider the
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(b) Two-input, two-output.
Figure 5 Randomised response. Every second label is the outcome of the randomised response
mechanism and alternately sk (for “skip”). The left most state represents the sensitive input.
two-input, two-output labelled Markov chain (Figure 5b), where we consider each input to
be from two independent respondents, using our methods verifies that the privacy does not
increase on the partitioned data. We consider the adjacency relation as the symmetric closure
of R = {((a, a), (a, b)), ((a, a), (b, a)), ((b, b), (a, b)), ((b, b), (b, a))}. We determine (ln( 65 ),
4
15 )-
differential privacy by computing max(s,s′)∈R ld6/5(s, s′) = 415 , verifying there is no privacy
loss from composition. Because randomised response is finite we can compute lvα for adjacent
inputs in exponential time for comparison. In this instance, our technique provides the
optimal solution, in the sense max(s,s′)∈R ld6/5(s, s′) = max(s,s′)∈R lv6/5(s, s′); indicating
that ldα and lgdα can provide a good approximation.
The basic composition theorems suggest that if a mechanism that is (ε, δ)-differentially
private is used k times, one achieves (kε, kδ)-differential privacy [13]. However, this is not
necessarily optimal. More advanced composition theorems may enable tighter analysis,
although this can can be computationally difficult (#P-complete) [25]. Even this may not
be exact when allowed to look inside the composed mechanisms. If we assume the responses
are from two questions answered by the same respondent and let R′ = R ∪ {((a, a), (b, b))},
naively applying basic composition concludes (ln( 3625 ),
8
15 )-differential privacy. Our methods
can find a better bound than basic composition since max(s,s′)∈R′ ld36/25(s, s′) = 103225 <
8
15 .
However, in this case, our technique is not optimal either.
9 Conclusion
Our results are summarised in Figure 1 on page 2. We are interested in the value of lvα, but
it is not computable and difficult to approximate. We have defined an upper bound ldα,
showing that it is more accurate than the previously known bound bdα from [9] and just
as easy to compute (in polynomial time with an NP oracle). We also defined a distance
based on the greatest fixed point, lgdα, which has the same flavour but can be computed
in polynomial time. When considering lvα directly, we approximate to arbitrary precision
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in PSPACE and show it is #P-hard (which generalises a known result on tv). It is open
whether the least fixed point bisimilarity distance (or any refinement smaller than lgdα) can
be computed in polynomial time, or even if lgdα = ldα. It is also open whether approximation
can be resolved to be in #P, PSPACE-hard, or complete for some intermediate class.
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